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What is copyright? A policymaker in the United States will tell you that
copyright is an instrument of consumer welfare, stimulating the production of
the widest possible array of literary and artistic works at the lowest possible
price. Ask the question of a practitioner on the European continent, and he
will tell you that copyright is at best a watered-down version of author's
right-that grand civil law tradition that places the author, not the consumer,
at the center of protection. A low protectionist will tell you that copyright is a
monopoly that undesirably drives up the price of goods in the marketplace. A
high protectionist will tell you that copyright is a property right-no more, no
less-and one without which we would have very few creative works in the
marketplace.
Ask the question of a United States trade official and she will tell you that
copyright is one of the strongest net contributors to the nation's balance of
trade. Ask the question of a school teacher in Thailand and he will tell you
that copyright is what stands in the way of getting textbooks into the hands of
his students. Ask the question of an anthropologist digging through the
remains of the 1976 Copyright Act a century from now and she might tell you
that copyright is the symbol of a nation's cultural aspirations. Ask the same
question today of a manufacturer of novelty knickknacks and he will tell you
that copyright is simply what enables him to meet his payroll at the end of the
week.
Confronting this welter of competing perspectives, it is tempting to agree
with Professor Lyman Ray Patterson that "the basic and continuing weakness
of copyright law in this country" is "the absence of fundamental principles for
copyright."' No one interested in copyright can afford to overlook Ray
Patterson's masterful history of Anglo-American copyright law. But on this
point I think Ray is wrong. I believe that there does in fact exist a cohering
view of copyright, a view that reconciles most if not all of the competing
antiphonies, and one that offers a sound prescription for public policy as well.
Under the view that I propose, copyright is not about protecting authors
or publishers, nor is copyright singularly about securing authors' welfare or
consumers' welfare. Copyright is not about bolstering international trade
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balances, nor is it about protecting art, high or low. Copyright is about none
of these things; and copyright is about all of them.
Copyright, in a word, is about authorship. Copyright is about sustaining
the conditions of creativity that enable an individual to craft out of thin air,
and intense, devouring labor, an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen
Kane. Copyright is as much about the pages of deleted text, the scenes that lie
on the cutting room floor, as it is about the refined work, the final cut, that
ultimately reaches the author's public. But copyright-and authorship-are
only in part about the act of creation. If creation is all there was to
authorship, copyright could comfortably leave the author scribbling alone in
his far-off garret. Authorship in its contemporary sense implies not just an
author, but an audience; not just words spoken, but individuals spoken to.
By "authorship" I mean authors communicating as directly as
circumstance allows with their intended audiences. Copyright sustains the
very heart and essence of authorship by enabling this communication, this
connection. It is copyright that makes it possible for audiences-markets-to
form for an author's work, and it is copyright that makes it possible for
publishers to bring these works to market. (As should by now be evident,
when I speak of "publishers" I mean the whole range of intermediaries-book
publishers, music publishers, motion picture producers, record producerswhose business it is to bring works to market.)
To be sure, copyright law and policy in different places may emphasize one
or another particular object over another. An emphasis on consumer welfare
is the hallmark of copyright jurisprudence in the United States, just as an
emphasis on author's right is the hallmark of the continental regimes. But
viewed globally, and in the round, it is authorship that provides the cohering
theme.
I believe that the historical materials support the view that copyright is at
heart a vehicle of authorship, a means for connecting an author to his
audience and enabling audiences to repay the author's effort. Contemporary
decisions of the United States Congress and courts also support this view of
copyright. But my aim today is as much to prescribe as it is to describe. I
hope to show not only that copyright is about authorship, but also that
authorship offers a helpful benchmark for copyright reform.
Authorship presupposes autonomy. For authorship to flourish, authors
must enjoy autonomy in their work. Authors must be protected from the
influence of anyone other than their intended audience. Authors must also
have the elbow room needed to ply their craft, freeing them to create those
works that they believe their audience desires. Both requirements have a legal
dimension. Copyright law must protect authors from any influence other than
their audience; it must not judge authors' efforts by too exacting a standard;
and it must not impose too severe a prohibition against authors' borrowing
from others.
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Authors and Their Audiences

Authorship in some form has existed from the time that humans emerged
as sentient beings, first daubing an arresting image on a cave wall. But for
authorship to blossom in its modem form, as a bond between the author and
any audience whom the power of his vision can command, three conditions
had to coincide: a technology that could bring the author's work within the
reach of any who desired it; a political environment in which no sovereign
could impede the communication between the author and his intended
audience; and an economic system that would facilitate, not thwart,
communication between the author and his audience.
The needed technology came first. Gutenberg's invention-in the West,
at least-of movable type opened the door to the mass dissemination of
writings. To be sure, the early printed books were not cheap, and it took
some time for books to become available to the masses at a price they could
pay. But by the fifteenth century the path was cleared for getting works to the
public in the form of affordable copies.
More than two centuries passed before the conditions of political and
economic life began to conduce to authorship. Until the 1700s, sovereigns in
England and on the continent had kept communications under their thumb,
imposing monopoly and licensing controls on the new printing technologies
in order to bar the dissemination of dissident views. But with the great
revolutions of the eighteenth century came the political freedom and the
commercial channels that-together with cheap printing-for the first time
ensured authors the ability to commit their vision, and their livelihood, to the
marketplace for ideas and the marketplace for goods. It is no accident that
the first copyright acts appeared at this moment in history.
I appreciate that this picture may seem too stark for some. Benjamin
Kaplan has observed that "copyright has the look of being gradually secreted
in the interstices of the censorship." 2 But, though history grinds slow, there is
no denying that events of consequence occur. Looking back, there can be no
question that-to take two examples-the Statute of Anne in 1710 and the
French decrees of 1791 and 1793 were events of consequence, liberating
authors from the control of the sovereign and engaging them for the first time
with the demands of unlimited audiences.
All this talk of authorship-of copyright securing an author's autonomous
relationship with her audience-sounds very uplifting. But then come the
doleful social critics. Copyright, they tell us, is not about authors nor is it
about authorship. Copyright, they say is about commerce-it is about
publishers and publishing. Citing the historical record, these doubters tell us
that the first copyright statutes were victories not for authors but for the lowly
printers who had shrewdly waged their cause under the authors' banner.
Hasn't copyright, these skeptics ask, merely traded the sovereign's control of
authorship for control by publishers? What sphere of personal autonomy,
2.
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what possibility for authorship, can exist when it is publishers who determine
those works that will reach the marketplace?
These are complex questions. It would certainly be convenient to my view
of authorship if publishers were transparent-neutral mediators between the
author and her public. In fact, and no less than other institutions, publishers
do fall victim to bureaucratic stubbornness and personal guile. Such failings
do stand in the way of authorship. But, in the main, what publishers do is
publish. Publishers differ in the size and nature of the markets they seek to
reach, in their horizon for profit, long or short term, and in their predictions
of what the public will buy. Small presses and independent bookstores
abound, as do independent motion picture producers and, to a lesser extent,
distributors. Overall, it is not publishers or producers-not even the muchscorned media conglomerates-who decide what will be published. It is
consumers who decide. A consumer-driven market for authorship is, to be
sure, not perfect. But it is better than the alternative.
I have spoken so far only of authorship's emergence from state control
into the vibrant workings of the marketplace, and not yet of law's role in
perfecting copyright as a market mechanism. What implications do the
general points just made have for public policy? What protection must
copyright offer if it is to sustain authorship in the marketplace?
Copyright encompasses one of the few areas of human endeavor in which
one can create value without diminishing the material resources available to
others. Even so, the fact that copyright enables authors to charge a positive
price for the use of their works has social consequence. The economists
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen have described the dilemma of granting
private property rights in public goods such as works of authorship that
embody information: "Without a legal monopoly not enough information will
be produced, but with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be
3
used."
Should public policy start from the premise that the copyright glass is half
empty or half full? The low protectionists say half-empty, arguing that
authors and publishers should receive no greater economic returns than they
needed to produce a particular work. If it would have taken no more than
$100,000 to get Margaret Mitchell to sit down at her typewriter to pound out
Gone With the Wind, and to get her publisher to publish the book, this is all they
should receive-and not the hundreds of millions of dollars of value that Gone
With the Wind has since produced in the marketplace. The low protectionists
would have Congress trim copyright law's exclusive rights to correspond to
the needed incentives. At the least, the low protectionists would urge
Congress to refrain from extending new rights unless and until it is convinced
that the revenues that the new right will secure are needed to induce artistic
production. To take a recently-debated example: If motion picture authors
and producers would still produce and distribute motion pictures without a
3.
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video rental right, there is no reason for copyright to outlaw unauthorized
video rentals.
The high protectionists respond that it would be wonderful if a publisher
could, ex ante and with absolute perfection, pick the one manuscript each year
that will enjoy the success of Gone With the Wind, and thus be able to reject all
the other submissions. Unfortunately or fortunately-depending on your
point of view-such confident predictions about public tastes are impossible.
A publisher needs many more times the $100,000 consumed by Gone With the
Wind to cover the costs of the many works that do not return a profit in the
marketplace.
I think the high protectionists have the better of the argument-at least
from the viewpoint of sustaining the conditions for authorship. Consider for
a moment the effects of patronage-whether from the Renaissance princes or
the United States Congress' modern Medicis. Patronage supports only those
authors whose creative efforts meet the patron's taste. Patronage depresses
authorship by shutting the author off from the wider audience that he might
hope to reach.
A weakened copyright system, of the sort for which the low protectionists
sometimes press, would tend in the same direction as patronage. In a world
where fewer rights secure fewer paying markets, publishers would be even
more inclined than they are at present to seek the common denominator that
will ensure them some economic return. They will spurn investments aimed
at markets that, having no obligation to pay copyright tribute, will not repay
copyright investment. The availability of risk capital would decline, as would
the willingness of publishers to try untried authors in the marketplace. A
robust copyright, by contrast, will mix the hope of high return on some works
with risk of loss on others, giving publishers, if not quite a lottery, then at least
a portfolio that will promote investment and sustain a wider variety of
authorship than could command support under any other legal system.
Most discussions of the rights properly to be conferred by copyright center
on the ultimately unyielding question, how much investment in music, art and
literature is enough investment? This inquiry overlooks the no less
important, far more productive, question of copyright's effect on the direction
of investment in music, art and literature. Authors and publishers will direct
their efforts and their resources toward those audiences that will pay for their
works. Whenever Congress withholds a right from a particular market,
allowing free use, it effectively shuts off the most effective means of
communication between an author and her audience-the price mechanism.
Assured of exclusive rights in some markets-the theatrical and television
motion picture markets, for example-authors and producers will shape their
works to the tastes of theater and television audiences. Denied rights in other
markets-the home videotape rental market, for example-authors and
producers have no reason to aim their efforts at the possibly quite different
tastes of audiences in these markets. To the extent that the tastes of
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audiences that get the work free diverge from the tastes of those who pay, the
variety of works overall will diminish, as will authorship generally.
Against all this is the low protectionist view that copyright is a monopoly
that unnaturally forces up prices. If we follow the economists' prescription
noted earlier, this is to some extent inevitable. But I think it is important to
separate the price consequences of the copyright property from the price
consequences of the patent property-consequences that policymakers too
often confuse. Patent protection may well confer market share and effectively
result in monopoly pricing. In copyright, however, a high degree of
substitutability invariably obtains. Although we would prefer not to admit it,
one author's expression will always be substitutable for another's. Were
Elmore Leonard's publisher imprudent enough to charge $75 for a copy of
his latest work, I expect Leonard would soon see many of his readers migrate
to the works, perhaps, of James Ellroy at $19.95, not to speak of paperback
reprints of the classics-Chandler, Hammett and Cain-at $4.95.
I find it consoling that, despite the longstanding academic debates over
high and low protection, the United States Congress has for two centuries
pursued a steady course of expanding the scope of copyright to encompass
new, economically valuable uses of copyrighted subject matter. To be sure,
Congress has always tempered the extension of copyright with recognition of
the problem of transaction costs-the problem that some individual uses of
copyrighted works will be so dispersed that any eventual license royalties will
not repay the expense of enforcement and negotiation. Also, inevitably,
political compromise or surrender has sometimes blunted the extension of
rights. The failed motion picture videocassette rental bill4 of some years back

is one example. Congress' failure so far to give a performance right to sound
recordings is another.
To some extent, technology can repair politically motivated omissions.
For example, emerging pay television systems under which a subscriber can
view a current film in her home, saving the bother of a trip to the rental store,
may soon obliterate the nonpaying rental market, while at the same time
returning revenues to motion picture producers. This prospect suggests that

the failure to pass a video rental bill may diminish in economic consequence.
But technology can also exacerbate political omissions. Digital audio
transmission of audio recordings is an example. With digital audio
transmission at hand, and their favorite recordings available on command,
music lovers may stop buying records and tapes; at the least, their inclination
to purchase phonorecords will dwindle. Recording artists and their producers
will consequently lose revenues from record, tape and disc sales. If Congress
continues to deny recording artists and producers a performance right in their
sound recordings, they will receive no revenues from home performances to
make up the difference. Deprived of any paying market for sound recordings,
4.
1983).
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their production of sound recordings will diminish-to the point, possibly, at
which sound recordings disappear.
Putting these cautionary observations to the side, I think it is historically
accurate to say that, in general, Congress has given copyright owners rights to
every market in which consumers derive value from their works and in which
transaction costs do not stand in the way of negotiated payments. Indeed,
Congress' record in meeting the challenge of the new dissemination
technologies invites comparison with the high protectionist model of the
continental author's right tradition. Legislators in this country may
sometimes invoke a low protectionist credo, in sharp ideological contrast to
the high protectionist creed of author's rights; but, all in all and with few
exceptions, the practical results on both continents have been roughly the
same.
B.

Authors and Their Works

Authorship not only requires authors to have direct access to their
audience. Authorship also requires that authors enjoy some not
inconsiderable margins-some copyright elbow room-in working within the
legal system. Copyright must be quick to protect any work that bears the
impress of an author's personality, and careful when prohibiting one author's
borrowings from another.
The question of elbow room arises any time a court must determine
whether the product of an author's labors evinces sufficient original
expression to qualify for copyright. In the United States, the judiciallyevolved rules on protectible subject matter reflect the belief that authorship is
more likely to flourish if Congress, the courts and the Copyright Office are
not too exacting in the demands they make on works seeking admission into
copyright. "E.T. Phone Home" may not rise to the level even of the
minimally expressive, "Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare," the line from
5
Edna St. Vincent Millay that Judge Frank told us would qualify for copyright.
A circus poster may not rise to the artistic level of a Mary Cassatt. But for
authorship to flourish, those who seek to be authors must receive the same
welcome as those who succeed as authors. Justice Holmes' perception in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. ,6 the circus poster case, that copyright
law should not allow the tastes of one generation to control the works
available to the next, similarly argues for substantial elbow room at the
threshold of protection.
Authorship also requires copyright law to give authors some freedom of
movement in drawing on the works of other authors for theme, inspiration
and ideas, even though-copyright being evenhanded-this means that their
works will be subject to the same sort of borrowings by others. The principle
at work here is the commonplace that all works of authorship build on the
5.
6.
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188 US 239 (1903).
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works and traditions that precede them. Copyright gives a limited property
right that at once promises an author protection for the product of her mind,
and ensures her the freedom to borrow unprotected elements from the
copyrighted works of others. Learned Hand's "abstractions" test 7 and
Zechariah Chafees' "patterns" test 8 leave no doubt that this is the most
delicate balance in all of copyright.
These two points-that copyright should give authors elbow room when
seeking protection for their own works, and when drawing on the works of
others-are connected. The connection is particularly evident in a
comparison of copyright protection for works of creative authorship-works
clearly reflecting the impress of an author's personality-and utilitarian
works-fact works and functional works-in which an author's personality
leaves only the faintest, if any, trace. The connection, roughly speaking, is
that the thinner is a work's creative content, the thinner will be its protection.
The first Copyright Act protected "maps, charts and books." Maps and
charts are by nature utilitarian products, reflecting little if anything of an
author's personality. The third class of works-books--could certainly
encompass works of creative authorship. But, in the early years of United
States copyright, the exigencies of practical life in a new nation filled this class
with works of low personal creativity as well-spellers, grammars,
dictionaries. Courts gave these utilitarian works only the narrowest scope of
protection, protecting them against literal copying-what we would today call
piracy. The result was fitting. Works of fact and function can efficiently be
expressed in only a limited number of ways; it is hard-or at least socially
costly-to recast them while retaining their utility. Also, in an age of
improvement, there was a perceived public interest in having improved
versions from competitors. It was thus natural for courts to emphasize what
the competitor contributed to a work over what the copyright owner lost.
Copyright's term of protection was correspondingly modest-fourteen years,
with a renewal term of equal duration.
This remained pretty much the story through the middle of the nineteenth
century: a predominance of utilitarian works and a low-level copyright statute
aimed at ensuring competition in the dissemination of fact and function in the
marketplace. With the emergence of an American tradition of creative
authorship in the mid-nineteenth century-with the works ofJames Fenimore
Cooper, Washington Irving and Nathaniel Hawthorne joining the more
humble spellers, grammars and dictionaries-the copyright situation changed
dramatically. Increasingly it became evident that personality and creativity
resided not in language alone, but that creativity lay also in a work's deeper
text, in the vision that the author sought to communicate to her audience. An
author's vision could transcend a particular language-English, German,
French-and a particular medium-novel, play or abridgement.
7.
8.

Aichols v Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F2d 119, 121 (2d Cir 1930).
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum L Rev 503, 513 (1945).
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In 1870 Congress expanded the scope of copyright by adding an exclusive
right against translations and an exclusive right against dramatizations. 9
Courts, too, recognized that creative authorship resides in more than the
surface language of a text.' 0 In the mid-1800's courts began to replace literal
similarity as the test for infringement with a more vexing-but altogether
appropriate-test of substantial similarity. It was at about this time, then, that
copyright in the United States took on its double aspect: protecting not only
utilitarian products, but also works of creative authorship.
How has copyright law fared in maintaining the balances struck for two
distinctly different kinds of work? Professor Jane Ginsburg has admirably
explicated the tensions created when two souls dwell in a single copyright
body, and I will not attempt to improve on her analysis here." But a quick
accounting to the bottom line may be in order.
On the positive side, courts have generally succeeded in retaining a narrow
scope of infringement protection for utilitarian copyright products (although
some of the computer program decisions contain worrisome language), while
giving a more generous ambit to works of creative authorship. On the
negative side, a uniform term of protection for utilitarian and creative workstypically 75 years in the case of fact and functional works that are commonly
made for hire-disrupts a copyright balance that, acceptable for works of
creative authorship, is doubtless excessive for utilitarian products. The easy
availability of preliminary injunctive relief, and copyright's virtually automatic
grant of permanent relief, together with the allied array of seizure remedies,
only aggravates this imbalance-a fact that prompted Professor Ginsburg to
propose equitable remuneration as the remedy for infringement of copyright
in works at the low end of authorship. But, apart from some rumblings in the
academic community-of which Professor Jerome Reichman's observations
drawn from the continental experience are certainly the most profound-the
mainstream has honored the bromide that "All is for the best in the best of
possible worlds."
Until, that is, the United States Supreme Court's decision this Term in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,12 holding that the alphabetized
listings in telephone directory white pages are not copyrightable. Make no
mistake: Feist is a landmark decision. As sober an observer of copyright law as
Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman said of Feist that "the Supreme Court
dropped a bomb."' 13 Where earlier Supreme Court decisions in this
century-Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing,"4 Mazer v. Stein ' 5 -told

us what

9. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat 212 c 230 § 86, 35 Cong 2d Sess.
10. See, for example, Daly v Palmer, 6 F Cas 1132 (CC SDNY 1868). See generally Kaplan, An
Unhurried View of Copyright at 9-34 (cited in note 2).
11. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creationand Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information,
90 Colum L Rev 1865 (1990).
12. !11 S Ct 1282 (1991).
13. Oversight Hearing, House of Representatives, April 10, 1991.
14. 188 US 239 (1903).
15. 347 US 201 (1954).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 2

subject matter came within copyright's embrace, Feist took the hard road of
telling us what subject matter falls outside of copyright. Just as the Supreme
Court's 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden, 16 describing the respective spheres of
copyright and patent law, was a defining event for copyright in the industrial
age, so Feist is a defining event for copyright in the information age.
While most observers had expected the result in the case-exempting
Feist from liability-few, if any, had anticipated the reasoning. White page
listings, the Court said, possess so little originality-so little authorship-that
they should receive no copyright protection at all, not even against the literal
poaching from which utilitarian products had been protected since the
beginning. Here then is the situation that Justice Holmes presumably had in
7
mind when in Bleistein he spoke of the "narrowest and most obvious limits"'1

for excluding subject matter from copyright protection-situations in which,
even indulging a wide margin for error, copyright protection for a product is
unnecessary to support the authorship enterprise generally.
What is most striking about Justice O'Connor's opinion for herself and
seven other members of the Court is its reliance on two bold and largely
unprecedented premises. First-a point made no fewer than sixteen times in
the opinion-is that creativity is part of copyright law's originality
requirement. This came as a surprise to those of us who had thought that,
outside the narrow field of photographs and art reproductions, originality
meant only that the copyright claimant had not copied from another source.
Second-a point made no fewer than thirteen times-is the Court's premise
that copyright's originality standard has a constitutional dimension. Again,
apart from some scattered dicta, this is pretty much new law.
What do these two premises imply for the future of copyright protection in
the United States? A friend from the Max Planck Institute in Munich, who was
visiting Stanford at the time Feist came down, observed: "This is a very
German opinion." What he was referring to, of course, is the strong bias in
German jurisprudence, and in continental doctrine generally, against giving
author's right protection to products that do not bear the impress of an
author's personality. There is a strong inclination to require some evidence
of "creativity"-something more than just independent creation-if a fact or
functional work is to obtain author's right protection. Absent such a showing
of creativity, courts and legislatures on the Continent prefer to leave the
protection of these products to unfair competition law and to the law of
neighboring rights.
I do not think that the Supreme Court in Feist was saying that the great and
socially valuable investments made in databases not rising to the announced
originality standard must go unprotected by intellectual property law. At least
I hope that's not the message. Rather, the Court appears to be saying that if
Congress wishes to protect telephone directory white pages and comparable
16.
17.

101 US 99 (1879).
188 US 251.
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databases it must do so under some constitutional power other than the
copyright power. The Court's reference to The Trademark Cases suggests that it
had the commerce power in mind, and some form of federal unfair
competition-misappropriation statute as the eventual legislative product.
Within such a new statutory framework, all copyright bets will be off: a
short term may be prescribed, a different remedial array, possibly including
compulsory licensing, may be offered, and perhaps Congress will include
cognate subject matter like industrial design and computer software whose
markets respond better to a low level of protection than to the high level of
protection that copyright offers to works of creative authorship. In two words,
a sui generis law-to date the province largely of academic speculation-may
become a political expedient.
C.

Authorship in the International Arena

Twenty-five years ago, almost to the month, Benjamin Kaplan introduced
his Carpentier Lectures at Columbia with the observation that on such
occasions "it is almost obligatory for a speaker to begin by invoking the
'communication revolution' of our time, and then to pronounce upon the
inadequacies of the present copyright act. . . ."18 I have not begun my
remarks today-nor shall I conclude them-by invoking those prospects. In
no small part this is because Ben Kaplan, with characteristic prescience,
envisioned virtually all of the technological shifts that today, and in the
coming years, seem likely to bedevil our copyright system. I should add that it
was the inadequacies of the 1909 Act-not the 1976 Act-of which Ben was
speaking. Time flies.
I will close instead with two observations on the international scene,
centering on what certainly has been the signal event in the United States'
international copyright relations this century: adherence to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
More than any other single document, the Berne treaty embodies the view
of copyright and authorship that I have sought to describe today. Berne's
prescription of broad, exclusive rights, with only stinting concessions to
compulsory licenses, reflects a vision of the personal autonomy that is an
essential condition of authorship. Berne's broad, indeed catholic, embrace of
protected works creates the authorial elbow room that I have described, while
its central focus on "works"-not "products," but "works"-commands the
presence of an author's hand, as does the Feist case.
The genius of Berne lies not, as some in the United States today would
have it, in moral right, nor even in author's right. The genius of Berne resides
in its promotion of authorship, in removing all barriers between an author
and his possible publics. Berne's prohibition on formalities, though not
introduced until 1908, is no afterthought. The prohibition bars governmentimposed hurdles-registration, notice-that separate the act of creation from
18.
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the public's receipt of works. In a word, Berne eliminates the last remnants of
the licensing, privilege and printing monopolies that copyright first began to
shrug off in the early eighteenth century as it started its gradual progress
toward sustaining authorship.
Membership in the Berne Union raises two questions for the United
States. First, what are our obligations to Berne members whose systems more
fully comply with the spirit of Berne than our own? Second, what are our
obligations to Berne members, and prospective Berne members, whose legal
systems and methods of enforcement less fully comply with Berne's strictures
than our own?
What are our obligations on the high side? With commendable foresight,
Congress in the 1976 Act moved us to the life plus fifty year term of
protection mandated by Berne, and the Berne Implementation Act removed
remaining obstacles-principally the notice and registration formalities-to
Berne adherence. Congress' recent, express addition of architectural works
to the subject matter of copyright ironed out one Berne wrinkle, and a bill
now pending to lift the renewal formality would ease another.
It seems unlikely, however, that there will be any forward movement in the
form of federal legislation expressly embodying the moral right prescription
of Article 6bis. I believe that the recent amendments to the 1976 Act giving
visual artists highly circumscribed rights of integrity and attribution represent
a door being closed rather than a door being opened. The reason for this has
less to do with industry opposition than with the allocation of power in our
federal system. Protection of reputational interests of the sort contemplated
by Article 6bis has in the United States traditionally resided in the states rather
than in the federal government. To my knowledge, no other Berne member
country divides up legislative competence quite as the United States does,
nor, consequently, suffers this jurisdictional constraint. Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act-a commercially driven, consumer oriented provision-may be
the best that moral right advocates can hope for on the federal level.
On the other side of the Berne ledger: What are our obligations to Berne
members and prospective Berne members whose economic systems are less
developed than ours? Here, of late, the trade process looms large, sometimes
almost obscuring the Berne process in its efforts to improve the United States'
intellectual property balance of trade. In the main, I believe that our trade
negotiators have got it right, at least to the extent that they have focused on
piracy-the production and distribution of unauthorized knockoffs. No
economically undeveloped country, however depressed its economy, has
much of lasting value to gain from piracy-certainly not in terms of
promoting domestic conditions of authorship.
Apart from a modesty befitting a nation that in its first century viewed itself
as a developing country, with no foreign copyright obligations, a proper
respect for political and cultural traditions abroad suggests that the United
States would do best to confine its trade efforts to piracy. For the nation's
initiatives to cut deeper-for example, into rules on fair use or fair dealing, or
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into standards of substantial similarity-could well disrupt local cultural
values and educational needs. I think, too, that it would be desirable to
promote schemes of equitable remuneration for the reproduction and
translation of educational materials generally in economically undeveloped
countries. These are the very tools that these countries need to lift
themselves to the levels of literacy and numeracy that competition in the
international marketplace requires. To be sure, copyright plays a small part in
a landscape of perennial famine, natural disaster and political repression. But
it can still play a part.
Membership in the Berne Union is, at bottom, an act of faith. It is an act of
faith that requires member nations with more highly developed economic,
legal and political systems to trust that other member nations will-however
gradually-move toward, rather than away from, the Berne model of
authorship. If the United States-its Congress, its courts and its executive
branch-is to keep that faith, it must, as it has already begun to do, move
toward a system of rights, unfettered by formalities, that will help sustain
authorship in all of its varied forms. But this country must also, with a
beseeming combination of charity, and a cold eye on the long horizon, accept
the short term struggles of economically and politically less developed nations
to advance toward those conditions of authorship that in this country we
accept, or I hope we soon will accept, as virtually a birthright.

